An optimal agent will base judgments on the strength and reliability of decision-relevant evidence. However, previous investigations of the computational mechanisms of perceptual judgments have focused on integration of the evidence mean (i.e., strength), and overlooked the contribution of evidence variance (i.e., reliability). Here, using a multielement averaging task, we show that human observers process heterogeneous decision-relevant evidence more slowly and less accurately, even when signal strength, signal-to-noise ratio, category uncertainty, and low-level perceptual variability are controlled for. Moreover, observers tend to exclude or downweight extreme samples of perceptual evidence, as a statistician might exclude an outlying data point. These phenomena are captured by a probabilistic optimal model in which observers integrate the log odds of each choice option. Robust averaging may have evolved to mitigate the influence of untrustworthy evidence in perceptual judgments.
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decision making | diffusion model | information integration P erceptual judgments typically involve a deliberative process in which evidence concerning the current state of the external world is considered. Over recent years, the twin goals of characterizing the computational mechanisms and the neural representations underlying this deliberation have come to the fore (1, 2) . Because sensory evidence coming from the external world is intrinsically noisy, decisions will benefit from repeated sampling and accumulation of the collected evidence (3) (4) (5) . Mathematical modeling studies support the view that serial sampling is a basic principle of choice behavior (3, (6) (7) (8) (9) , and recent neurophysiological recordings identify the parietal cortex as a candidate site for evidence accumulation in psychophysical tasks (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) . However, the precise computations by which a decision variable (DV) is constructed and updated during decision making remain controversial (2, 4) .
One popular framework posits that integration is a simple summation process under which choices and their latencies depend linearly on the strength of sensory input (3, 15, 16) . This mechanism is often illustrated by analogy to a court of law, where the jury tots up evidence for or against a guilty verdict (1). However, in a stochastic environment, committing to an action on the basis of evidence strength alone can be suboptimal, because evidence may strongly favor one option over another just by chance (17, 18) . Rather, a statistically optimal policy is to base decisions on independent estimates of the strength (i.e., mean) and reliability (i.e., variance) of the currently extant sensory evidence, just as a researcher might compare two samples of data on the basis of an inferential statistic rather than merely calculating their central tendencies (19) . To continue the courtroom analogy, a shrewd jury will consider not only how incriminating evidence is, but also the trustworthiness of the source of the evidence. These two factors are not necessarily correlated: For example, severely indicting evidence (e.g., an eyewitness to a crime) might originate from an untrustworthy source (e.g., a coconspirator with a vested interest), whereas mildly incriminating evidence (e.g., doubt cast on an alibi) might be offered by a highly authoritative source (e.g., official telephone records).
Although a rich psychophysical literature has sought to characterize the computations by which sensory evidence is transformed into action (20) , most previous studies were poorly suited to estimating the independent contributions of evidence strength and reliability to this process, because the signal (mean) and noise (variability) are typically manipulated inversely as signal-to-noise ratio. For example, in the random dot motion paradigm, in which observers discriminate the net direction of motion of a cloud of moving dots, the average signal strength rises, and the signal variability falls, as the percentage of coherently moving dots tends toward the maximum (21, 22) . The question thus arises of whether our perceptual judgments reflect only the mean of the evidence or also its reliability.
We addressed this question by considering three bounded accumulation models that compute the decision variable in distinct ways. Our first model simply accumulates the mean of the evidence on a given trial (the simple averaging model below). Our second model integrates the signal-to-noise ratio, scaling the mean evidence by its deviance (the SNR model below). Finally, the third model accumulates the log of the probability ratio between the two alternatives (the LPR model below), thereby converting the bounded accumulation process into a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). The SPRT is optimal in the sense that it makes the fastest decisions for a given error rate (2, 9) and this model also proposes a DV that is known to scale with the firing rates of parietal neurons during categorization tasks (13) . Comparing these models to human data allowed us to arbitrate between these different accounts of human perceptual judgments.
Here, we used a multielement averaging task (Fig. 1A ) in which participants viewed arrays of eight simultaneously presented elements and discriminated the average value on a feature dimension (e.g., is the average color more red or blue? Is the shape more like a square or a circle?) (23, 24) . This task allowed us to manipulate orthogonally the mean and the SD of the evidence presented to the subject on a given trial (Fig. S1 ). The mean was set either near (low mean evidence) or far (high mean evidence) from the boundary between the two response categories, and the array variance was varied at three levels (high, medium, or low evidence reliability). Critically, this paradigm also allowed us to assess the unique contribution of each element to the choice and thus to compare the contributions of inlying (i.e., close to the array mean) and outlying (i.e., far from the array mean) elements to the decision. We report two behavioral phenomena: (i) decision latencies are lengthened and errors increased, when arrays are more variable, even when array mean, signal-to-noise ratio, and across-trial category uncertainty are taken into account; and (ii) humans observers base their decision principally on inlying perceptual evidence, downweighting or excluding the outlying elements in their decision much as a statistician would discard outliers in a sample of data. Moreover, this robust averaging behavior is captured by a decision model in which observers accumulate not the array mean or the signal-to-noise ratio, but a quantity reflecting the logarithm of the probability ratio between the two possible choices.
Results
We describe four behavioral studies using different variants of the multielement averaging task. In all experiments, participants in each trial viewed an array of eight elements varying in shapes and colors. Experiments 1 and 2 required participants to judge the average color (red/blue) of ellipses with variable axes of elongation. In experiment 3, subjects judged the color (red/blue, experiment 3a) in one session and the shape (circle/square, experiment 3b) in the other session. Finally, in experiment 4, subjects judged the average color of stimuli occupying two different portions of the feature space (red/purple, purple/blue), a control manipulation allowing us to rule out low-level nonlinearities in the perceptual space as an explanation for our results.
In what follows we denote by x k the evidence value for the element k, that is, the position of the element k relative to the boundary between the two possible choices, x k taking positive or negative values (e.g., in the red/blue task x k is positive if element k is more red and negative if it is bluer). We also denote by μ the mean of these evidence values over the eight elements of the array and by σ the SD of these evidence values. With these notations our manipulation of the mean strength is reflected in the absolute value of μ (noted |μ|), i.e., the absolute distance between the mean evidence and the category boundary. Our manipulation of the reliability of the evidence is reflected in σ.
Effects of the Mean and the Variance in the Decision Space. Fig. 1B presents the effects of evidence strength (|μ|) and reliability (σ) on choice accuracy and response times (RTs) on correct choices across all three experiments. As expected, in experiment 1 we found that increasing the mean evidence (|μ|) led to lower error rates and shorter RTs [F err (1, 30) Importantly, trials were presented in a randomized order, so the uncertainty about category assignations (or, in signal detection theory terms, the variance of the probability density functions associated with each option) was fully equated between conditions and in particular was not confounded with our withintrial variance manipulation.
Having established the effect of within-trial variability on performance, we ran several analyses to demonstrate that this effect cannot simply be explained by (i) disruption of low-level perceptual processes, (ii) variations in signal-to-noise ratio, or (iii) participants adopting a strategy of counting the number of elements either side of the category boundary.
First, in experiment 3, the manipulation of variance on both the task-relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions allowed us to separate perceptual and decision-related effects of variability. Specifically, if the effect of variability is a low-level perceptual effect, we would expect for instance the color variability to affect behavior both during the color task and during the shape task. Conversely, if variability effects occur at the decision level, they should be confined to the task-relevant dimension. The results of experiment 3 argued strongly in favor of the latter view (Fig. 1C) Second, using partial correlation analyses across all three experiments, we show that accuracy was influenced by variability even when signal-to-noise ratio (i.e., |μ|/σ for each combination of μ and σ) was accounted for. To do this, we conducted a partial regression analysis with an additional covariate encoding the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (i.e., |μ|/σ using our notation) for each trial. The main effect of variance remained reliable in the presence of this covariate (P < 0.005), indicating that evidence reliability influences choice even beyond the SNR. This result is also illustrated in Fig. 1B , where the "low variance, low mean" conditions (left black data point) and the "mid-variance, high mean" conditions (center gray data point), which have identical SNRs, give rise to significantly different levels of performance [t (1, 76 ) > 4, P < 0.001, for both the error rates and RTs].
Finally, we found similarly that choice latencies correlated with evidence variability even when the number of elements falling on the other side of the boundary was controlled for (P < 0.005). We conducted this analysis in a similar manner to that above, using a correlation analysis across all three experiments with a partial covariate that encoded the number of elements belonging to the category of the nonchosen option. This analysis allows us to rule out interpretation of the variability effect based on participants counting the elements on each side of the boundary.
Computational Simulations of Evidence Integration in the Multielement Task. How, then, do observers integrate information during perceptual judgments? To address this question, we adopted a well-described computational model (the drift-diffusion model) (3) (4) (5) , in which choices result from noisy perceptual evidence being accumulated up to a bound:
A B C Fig. 1 . (A) Participants discriminated the average color (red vs. blue, experiments 1, 2, and 3a) or shape (square vs. circle, experiment 3b) of eight elements arranged in a circle around fixation. Reponses were made with a button press with a deadline of 1,500 ms. Fully informative feedback was offered in every trial. (B) The eight elements were drawn from distributions with weak or strong evidence in favor of each option (low mean vs. high mean) and with low, medium, or high variance. Response times (Left) and errors (Right) were affected by the manipulation of mean and variance in the decision-relevant dimension. Error bars (SEM) are represented, but are typically smaller than the size of the data point, given the number of participants (total n = 77). (C) However, the same manipulation of mean and variance in the decision-irrelevant dimension did not produce the effects (data from experiment 3 only).
Specifically, the DV grows on each sample t by an increment composed of the momentary evidence A and Gaussian noise of mean 0 and variance c 2 , until choices are made when the DV crossed one of two prespecified bounds Z and -Z (SI Methods). Here, we simulated three variants of this process, in which the momentary evidence A was derived from the sensory inputs in three distinct ways.
In the simple averaging model, the momentary evidence was the average of the evidence carried by the n channels (here, n = 8). This model ignores the within-trial variance in the perceptual array. In a second model, the SNR model, the DV is updated by the ratio between the mean evidence and its SD, thus allowing within-trial variance to affect decisions. Thus, we have A ¼ μ; for the simple averaging model [2] A ¼ μ σ ; for the SNR model:
Finally, we created a third model [the logarithm of the posterior ratio (LPR) model] that accumulated sensory input in a probabilistic space, by proposing that a stimulus value x drawn from the array is a probabilistic cue that the response category R 1 or R 2 will be reinforced and that observers should use this cue to maximize the accuracy of their decisions. In this situation, the optimal decision variable to consider is the logarithm of the likelihood ratio (LLR) (2, 9) . In our simulations we used the LPR. This quantity is equal to the LLR when the two responses are of equal prior probabilities (by Bayes' rule), and it can be easily estimated from the data, from the relative frequencies of R 1 and R 2 being rewarded when x is presented (13) (for more details, see Methods and SI Methods). In this model, the decision increment is the log posterior ratio averaged over the elements presented on the current trial:
LPRðx k Þ; for the LPR model;
where
We fit each model to each individual participant's error rates, by letting the two free parameters (Z and a) vary over a large search space (minimizing the total mean square error between the six empirical and the six simulated error rates represented in Fig. 2 ). Then, we used the resulting parameters to predict RTs on correct choices (for more details, see SI Methods). Because experiments 1-3 yielded equivalent results, we present the simulations averaged across these experiments (n = 77, experiments 3a and 3b being treated as independent datasets). The (fitted) error rates and the (predicted) RTs of the three models are shown in Fig. 2 A-C (model data, lines; human data, dots). As can be seen, the SNR and LPR models were able to capture the elevated decision times for the more variable condition, whereas the simple averaging model ( Fig. 2A) was not. In fact, the simple averaging model incorrectly predicts shorter RTs when variability increases [F RT (2,152) = 28.55, P < 0.001, ANOVA over the simulated subjects]. In situations where increasing the within-trial deviance σ also increases the variability of the mean across trials (which is true by default and true in experiments 1 and 2), these faster RTs are also predicted from previously described analytical solutions (e.g., equation 2.9 in ref.
2). We note that these analytical solutions also show that increasing the noise parameter of the diffusion reduces response latencies and thus cannot recreate the variability effect. In situations where the within-trial variability σ is decoupled from the between-trial variability of the mean (e.g., if the elements' values are pseudoselected to have identical precision of the mean across the different variance conditions, as in experiment 3) (Methods), then the model would predict almost constant RTs across variability conditions (in our simulations the difference between conditions was reduced to 6 ms), which still is incompatible with the empirical data. Together, these findings rule out an entire class of model in which simple summation is used to integrate incoming sensory evidence to form a perceptual decision.
Robust Averaging Across Elements in the Decision Space. To distinguish between the SNR and LPR models, we turned to another aspect of the human observers' data, namely their tendency to base their decisions on inlying vs. outlying evidence within each stimulus array (evidence values being roughly Gaussian across elements within a trial). Because the SNR model scales the evidence from each element equally by the variance, it predicts that outlying elements (i.e., those that fall far from the array mean, e.g., the four extreme elements of the array according to rank) and inlying elements (i.e., those close to the array mean, e.g., the four centrally ranked elements of the array) should make equivalent contributions to the eventual choice. By contrast, the LPR model, in which evidence values are compressed at the extremes, predicts that the contribution of outlying elements should be compromised relative to inlying elements.
To arbitrate between these possibilities, we used logistic regression to estimate the weights associated with each element of the array ranked by its feature value. Across all three experiments, the decision tuning function across ranks exhibited an inverted-u shape [ Fig. 3A : effect of rank on the beta: F (7,76) = 14.67, P < 0.001], indicating that the contribution of outlying evidence was muted in the eventual decision. Crucially, this behavior was predicted by the LPR model (Fig. 3B) , but neither by the simple averaging model nor by the SNR model (both P > 0.25; Fig. S2 ). The failure of these latter models to capture this effect not only allows us to distinguish between them as accounts of perceptual integration, but also provides reassurance that the observed shape Errors and reaction times for the three models. Dots indicate reaction times on correct choices (Left) and error rates (Right) for weak (low mean: black) vs. strong (high mean: gray) evidence and for low, medium, and high variability conditions (x axis). Lines show best fits to the data from (A) the simple averaging, (B) the SNR, and (C) the LPR models. In each case, best-fitting parameters were estimated from error rates and were used to predict RTs. Error bars (SEM) are typically smaller than the size of the dots, given the number of participants (total n = 77).
of the decision tuning function is not a trivial function of our analysis strategy.
This downweighting of outlying elements was more prominent for the most variable trials, a feature that was also captured by the LPR model [ Fig. 4A , bars; human data, lines, LPR model; interaction between inlying vs. outlying and variability, F (2,152) = 19.15, P < 0.001]. The relation between downweighting and variability was also manifest across subjects: We observed a significant correlation between the difference in weights for inlying vs. outlying elements and the magnitude of the variability effect on RTs ( Fig. 4B ; correlation, r = 0.30, P < 0.005). A robust regression analysis of the downweighting effect on the variability effect revealed a positive slope (P < 0.005), confirming that this relation was not driven by outliers in the cohort. The downweighting effect was, however, not correlated with the effect of mean evidence on RTs (r = 0.07, P > 0.5), showing that downweighting outlying elements is specifically associated with observers being sensitive to the variability of the evidence.
Importantly, we ensured that the decision tuning functions reflected the elements' positions in the decision space, not in the stimulus space. Indeed, performing the logistic regressions in the different mean evidence conditions, we found that the weighting profile across ranks tracked the mean evidence of the current trial, rather than simply the mean across the entire experiment ( Fig. 4C and Fig. S3 ), another feature of the data predicted by the LPR model (Fig. 4D) . This result could not be the case if the weighting was due to the stimulus information only. Additionally, when ranked according to the decision-irrelevant dimension, the elements' decision-relevant values exhibited a flat weighting profile (Fig. 3A, Right) , which further demonstrates that the contribution of an element to the choice is determined only by its position in the decision space and that the inlying vs. outlying elements are defined only in the decision space. Because we also show that our effects occur across two different, arbitrarily defined feature spaces, shape and color, it is very unlikely that they reflect low-level nonlinearities in perceptual processing. Nevertheless, to further demonstrate this point, we carried out an additional control (experiment 4) in which participants had to average information drawn from two distinct portions of the color space (i.e., red vs. purple, purple vs. blue) in different sessions. Computing decision tuning functions separately for each session allowed us to ask whether participants downweighted information with a particular value in perceptual space (e.g., they distrusted extreme values of red or blue) or whether they downweighted information at the extremes of the decision space (e.g., they distrusted the extremes of the decision-relevant color space). Specifically, we tested the hypothesis that perceptually identical elements would be assigned different decision weights as the task-relevant feature space was shifted. Applying the same logistic regression analyses separately on the two tasks, the decision tuning functions obtained in experiment 4 (Fig. S4) provided straightforward evidence that participants based their decision more on inlying elements than on outlying elements, irrespective of where the elements fall in our color space [inlying vs. outlying: t (23) > 4, P < 0.001 for both tasks].
Discussion
Perceptual judgments result from a deliberative process in which an observer gathers and integrates evidence from the external world. Here we used a multielement averaging task to shed light on the integration rule used by human observers during perceptual decisions. Manipulating the mean strength and the reliability of the decision-relevant information, we found that decision accuracy was compromised both by reducing the strength of the currently available evidence (i.e., by manipulating distance to the categorical boundary) and by decreasing its reliability (i.e., by manipulating the variability of evidence within a single trial). Moreover, we found that observers based their choices more on inlying evidence (that falling close to the mean of the evidence on that trial) than on outlying evidence (that falling at the extremes). This result implies that observers are engaging in robust averaging during perceptual judgment, i.e., they are excluding or downweighting the less trustworthy elements in the array.
Measuring choice latencies as well as choices allowed us to arbitrate among three competing accounts of how observers were performing the task, each embodying a distinct hypothesis about the computational rule by which perceptual decisions pool multiple sources of evidence. We found that the model that best describes the human data, and the only model that produced the robust averaging behavior, is one in which the accumulated evidence (the DV) scales with the LPR of the two perceptual options. This is interesting for several reasons. First, previous work in the psychology of categorization has demonstrated participants can learn to assign appropriate weights to discrete dimensions of a category exemplar when these contribute in unequal measure to the decision (25) (26) (27) . Our results complement this finding by pointing to distortions that arise in the representation of continuous evidence along a single dimension (e.g., color). Second, our work contributes also to a literature that suggests that perceptual systems encode the summary statistics associated with a visual array or scene (25, 26) . Our data suggest that participants actively use these summary statistics in deciding what is present in the external world. Third, neurophysiological recordings during a sequential integration task have shown that the responses of neurons in the parietal cortex scale with the loglikelihood ratio during perceptual decisions (13) .
In the LPR model used here, the variability of the current perceptual evidence is not explicitly represented. Rather, robust averaging is a natural consequence of the learning mechanisms occurring in the stimulus-action-outcome frame of reference, i.e., the associative mechanisms linking portions of the decision space to each of the available options. Compression of the evidence values at the extremes of the decision space is a natural consequence of the roughly sigmoid shape of the posterior probability function. It is interesting that an optimal framework for integrating evidence from multiple sources can be approximated with a simple, neurobiologically plausible mechanism such as this. Nevertheless, the work described here does not rule out accounts in which observers would explicitly represent the variance in the external world. For example, a fully Bayesian model that attempts to recover the generative mean and variance of the current array is likely to capture many of the behavioral effects described here, albeit in a computationally more demanding fashion, and arguably with less neurobiological plausibility. Indeed, a recent brain imaging study showed that in reward-guided decisions, the anterior cingulate cortex may track the reliability of recent outcomes and adjust learning accordingly (18) . An important question for further research is whether distinct neural correlates of the mean and variance of the evidence can be identified using functional neuroimaging. For instance, neurons in the macaque parietal cortex exhibit firing rates that scale with the expected value of a stimulus (14) , including in tasks where successive stimuli contribute to a decision (13) . In humans, successive evidence accumulation has been associated with the basal ganglia (27) (28) (29) (30) or parieto-central loci (31) . However, the precise determinants of these neural responses remain unclear.
To conclude, we have found that when human observers are required to consider multiple sources of evidence to form a perceptual judgment, they discard outlying decision-relevant values when evidence is variable. Control analyses demonstrate this robust averaging phenomenon is specific to the decision variable and not driven by low-level perceptual characteristics of the stimuli or local nonlinearities in the perceptual space (e.g., categorical perception of color). This downweighting strategy might seem somewhat counterintuitive in a task requiring the observer to make a judgment about the mean. However, from a statistical perspective this behavior might be more reliable than pure averaging: When sensory signals from a single source are corrupted by variability, extreme values arise that poorly indicate the true underlying source. Thus, compression of outlying values during integration of evidence may have evolved for our decision making to be resistant to grossly erroneous or irrelevant information. Indeed, an agent who bases decisions on the mean evidence alone, with no regard for its reliability, will be prone to impulsive choices based on noise mistaken for signal (17) . Together, the present findings reveal that human perceptual decision making is robust, with outlying evidence being downweighted, much as a researcher might choose to exclude an observation that differs radically from the rest of the sample (32).
Methods
Participants. All four experiments took place in the Department of Experimental Psychology at University of Oxford. Subjects (number of participants: N 1 = 31, N 2 = 14, N 3 = 16, N 4 = 24) were students recruited from the University of Oxford (age range: 18-25). They reported normal or corrected vision and no history of neurologic or psychiatric illness. Experiment 3 was divided into two sessions (3a and 3b) occurring on different days (counterbalanced order). Experiment 4 was divided into two sessions (4a and 4b), run one after the other (counterbalanced order) on the same day. Participants provided written consent before the experiment and were reimbursed (£10/h) for their participation. All experiments were approved by the local ethics committee.
Stimuli. The stimulus array was constituted by eight elements positioned on a circle around fixation (radius ∼3°visual arc) at regularly spaced angular positions (Fig. 1 ). Stimuli were generated using the PsychToolBox (www. psychtoolbox.org) for MATLAB (Mathworks) and presented on a 17′′ CRT screen (resolution: 1,024 × 768) viewed from a distance of 60 cm. Each element was defined by two parameters, a "color value" C and a "shape value" S, manipulated independently and taking values between 0 and 1. For colors, the parameter C defined the color of the element in Red-Green-Blue the shapes were ellipses with vertical and horizontal main axes, elongated either vertically or horizontally, by using the parameter S to transform an original circle (width = height = 50 pixels) by adding the quantity 50 × (S − 0.5) in pixels to its width and subtracting it from its height. In experiments 3 and 4, we used superelliptic shapes (a.k.a. squircles), which provide a parameterization between squares and circles. The parameter S was converted into a value n (simply, n = S + 1) corresponding to the curvature of a superellipse with equal semidiameters (a = 25 pixels), whose contours (x, y) are mathematically defined by the following equations:
∀ θ ∈ ½0; 2π; xðθÞ ¼ a × signðcosðθÞÞ × jcosðθÞj n and yðθÞ ¼ a × signðsinðθÞÞ × jsinðθÞj n :
Varying n in [1, 2] allowed us to create shapes varying gradually between a square and a circle (see SI Methods for an illustration). We further ensured that all elements occupied the same area on the screen by correcting the semidiameter a using the following relation:
where Γ is the gamma function:
Task and Design. The participants' task was to judge whether the average color of the eight elements currently on the screen was more red/blue (experiments 1, 2, and 3a), red/purple (experiment 4a), or purple/blue (experiment 4b) or whether the average shape of the elements was more square/circle (experiment 3b). Participants indicated their response using a two-buttons mouse with their preferred hand and received auditory feedback: two ascending tones (400-800 Hz, 100 ms each) and descending tones (800-400 Hz, 100 ms each) followed correct responses and errors, respectively. The correct response on the current trial was defined by the generative mean of the eight values for the task-relevant parameter. Each participant ran a first training block (100 trials), followed by 6-10 experimental blocks, in which all conditions were presented in a randomized order. All sessions lasted ∼1 h and corresponded to ∼1,000 trials. Color and shape parameters were defined in the interval [0, 1] and generated by trimming random samples from normal distributions with prespecified means (mc, ms) and SDs (σc, σs). In experiments 3 and 4 we ensured that the resulting means and SD matched the predefined ones (tolerance 0.1%), by resampling when necessary. Typically, the SDs were varied in three levels (low, medium, and high), and the means were varied in four levels, corresponding to low vs. high mean evidence for the two response categories (e.g., for the red/blue task: really red vs. slightly red vs. slightly blue vs. really blue). Numerical values for the SDs were in the [0.05, 0.15] range, and for the means they varied in the [−0.1, 0.1] range around the value of the category boundary. For experiments 1-3 (red/blue task or square/circle task), the boundary between the response categories was in the middle of the parameter space (i.e., 0.5), but for experiment 4 we used a boundary at 0.25 (purple/blue task) or 0.75 (purple/red task). Specific values for all parameters in all experiments are given in SI Methods.
LPR Model. This model is an adaptation of the LLR model, already described in previous studies (e.g., ref. 13) , to our case of multiple elements. To simulate this model, we first converted the elements' individual values into log posterior ratios. To do so, we considered all elements presented to the subject as associated with either R 1 or R 2 being the correct response (given the feedback). Then, we computed the posterior probability of R 1 on 100 bins regularly spaced on the parameter space (after discarding 5% of extreme values for which the probability estimation involves very few data points): In each bin, we computed the frequency of R 1 being the correct association for the elements falling in that bin. We fitted a sigmoid function of the bins to the resulting probabilities (SI Methods and Figs. S5 and S6), which we then applied to each element. Finally, we converted the obtained posterior probabilities in log odds [i.e., transforming P → into log(P/(1 − P))] to get the LPR. This procedure was carried out for each subject separately.
The sum of the LLR is the optimal decision variable to consider for a bounded accumulation model (2, 9) . Also, because in our models the noise, bounds, and increments scale together (see ref.
2), taking the sum is equivalent to taking the average over the eight elements. We favored the average to express all three models in similar forms. Importantly, the optimality depends on the elements being sampled independently. Thus, the LPR model represents the optimal process for an observer considering (inaccurately) the elements as if they were independent (SI Methods).
Supporting Information
de Gardelle and Summerfield 10.1073/pnas.1104517108 SI Methods Stimuli, Design, and Task. On each trial, eight color values (denoted C) and eight shape values (denoted S) were drawn randomly from normal distributions with prespecified means (mc, ms) and SDs (σc, σs). For each feature dimension, the mean could take one of four values (e.g., for color, from really red to slightly red to slightly blue to really blue), and the SD could take one of three values (low, medium, high). See Fig. S1 for a representation of the design.
The mean factor was then collapsed from four levels to two levels, by averaging across response categories: "slightly red" and "slightly blue" were considered together as "weak evidence" ("low mean") conditions, and "really red" and "really blue" were considered together as "strong evidence" ("high mean") conditions.
We parameterized the shape and color values (C and S) of individual elements between 0 and 1, and the means (mc, ms) and SDs (σc, σs) were controlled in a generic manner as In the following, we denote by x k the evidence value of the element k. That is, in the color task we have x k = C k − m ref , and in the shape task we have x k = S k − m ref for each element. The evidence value is the position of the decision-relevant parameter relative to the decision boundary. It can be positive or negative, and for instance in the red/blue color task x k takes positive values for redder elements and negative values for bluer elements, in the red-blue continuum presented in Fig. S1 .
In experiment 1, four levels for mc, three levels for σc, and four levels for ms were manipulated orthogonally (mc scaling = 0.05, σc scaling = 0.05, ms scaling = 0.05). In each trial the value of σs was taken to be the same as the value of σc. In experiment 2, four levels for mc and three levels for σc were manipulated orthogonally (mc scaling = 0.025, σc scaling = 0.0333). The shape parameters were kept constant (ms = 0, σs = 0.05). In experiment 3, four levels for mc, three levels for σc, four levels for ms, and three levels for σs were manipulated orthogonally (mc scaling = 0.05, σc scaling = 0.0666, μs scaling = 0.05, σs scaling = 0.0666). In experiment 4, four levels for mc, three levels for σc, four levels for ms, and three levels for σs were manipulated orthogonally (mc scaling = 0.0375, σc scaling = 0.05, ms scaling = 0.05, σs scaling = 0.0666).
Data Analyses. The main analyses focused on the percentage of errors as well as response times (RTs) for correct trials. Then error rates and RTs were averaged for each subject and conditions (2μ × 3σ = 6 conditions) and submitted to between-subject ANOVAs. Three participants (in experiment 1) were excluded from the group analyses because they exhibited an average performance around chance level.
Additionally, we conducted logistic regression analyses to assess how participants weighted the different pieces of evidence (i.e., the eight values of the decision-relevant parameter) to make their choice. These analyses were carried out in two steps, by assessing the weight of evidence for each subject and then using t tests or ANOVAs at the group level. For each subject level, we estimated the coefficients for a generalized linear regression in which the decision-relevant values of the stimuli predicted the subject's responses. The responses were coded in a vector of dimensions (trials × 1) vector containing 0 for one category and 1 for the other. The predictors were coded as a vector of dimensions (trials × 9) matrix constituted by the decision-relevant values (i.e., the C values in the color task, the S values in the shape task) coded between 0 and 1 (consistently with the response codes) plus a constant term to estimate the intercept. Using probit or logistic models to estimate the beta coefficients produced equivalent results. Under the probit model, responses Y were taken to follow a binomial distribution with a probability P affected by the predictors in X, such that P = Phi(X′ beta) where Phi is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Under the logistic model, the betas are estimated such that log(P/(1 − P)) = X′ beta. This analysis was performed using the glmfit function in Matlab. Trials in which no response was given were not included in these analyses.
Crucially, the values of the eight elements were sorted before including them as predictors in the regression, so that the beta coefficients would correspond to the weighting of the evidence, respectively for each ranked element in the array.
For each participant we normalized the eight weights by dividing them by their root mean square. Importantly this normalization was neutral with respect to the finding that different elements might receive different weight of evidence. We used this normalization to downweight the contribution of individual subjects for which the estimation of the weights would be too unreliable (which might happen for a particular participant in a particular condition, if the number of errors in the trials is too small).
When comparing the treatment of inlying elements and outlying elements, we simply averaged the resulting normalized weights separately for elements ranked 1, 2, 7, and 8 (outlying) and for elements ranked 3, 4, 5, and 6 (inlying). This procedure was done subject by subject and we then used T-tests or ANOVA at the group level.
Computational Models. We simulated three random-walk models of decision making. These models were all based on the same "evidence accumulation up to a bound" principle. On each trial, a decision variable (DV) is formed by accumulating momentary evidence (A) corrupted by noise (a Gaussian random variable of variance c 2 and mean 0). A choice is made when this decision variable reaches a predefined boundary value (Z for one choice, −Z for the other choice). Note that we used a simplified version of this type of model, in which the accumulation starts at zero, and the boundary conditions for the two choices are symmetrical. This is reasonable because choices in favor of one category are equally likely as choices in favor of the other category (i.e., there are as many "red" trials as "blue" trials), and participants do not show any bias toward one of the response categories.
Such a model can be formalized generically in the following way:
Start with no prior: DV 0 ¼ 0. Then for t > 0, the time in the number of simulation cycles, do
Then check whether the DV reaches one of the bounds at time t: If DV ≥ Z (resp. DV ≤ −Z), then consider R 1 (resp. R 2 ) as the choice and t as the RT and stop the accumulation process.
For all models, our approach was to present the model with the same numerical input values as in the experimental data and adjust the numerical value of the bound and noise parameters separately for each subject to fit the subject's error rates across the 2 means × 3 variance conditions. Fitting was done by minimizing the mean square error over a large 2D search space for possible values for the noise deviance c and the bound Z. Then, once the best values for c and Z were found for each participant, the simulated RTs were rescaled from cycles to seconds by adjusting the mean and SD of the RTs in cycles to the participant's mean and SD, to allow for comparing simulated and real RTs within the same units and on the same graph. This rescaling of RTs was, critically, neutral to our hypothesis as it did not affect the relative pattern across conditions of simulated RTs and left the trial-by-trial choices of the model (and thus the weighting function) unchanged.
The models we simulated differed only in the way they increment the input values, that is, in the way the value of A was derived from the value of the elements x k (we remind the reader that x k denotes the position of the element k relative to the boundary between R 1 and R 2 ). We also denote by μ the mean of the evidence values of the sample and by σ the SD of these evidence values:
In our three models, the increment A is defined in three different ways:
i) In the simple averaging model:
LPRðx k Þ, where LPR(x)
relates the value x to the log of the posterior probability ratio between the two possible choice options (see details below).
LPR model. This model is an adaptation of the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) model, already described in previous studies, to our case of multiple elements (e.g., ref. 1). This model considers the parameter values not in their native space but in a probability space, which is shaped by the relation between the elements' values and the underlying state of the world. The idea is that if the value x in the parameter space is presented several times and if each presentation is paired with an indication about the underlying state of the world (R 1 or R 2 ), one can estimate the probabilities of R 1 or R 2 given the value x. The LLR is an optimal decision variable for a bounded accumulation process, as it transforms it into a sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), which gives the fastest decision times for a given level of accuracy (2, 3) . The estimation of the LLR can be done simply by computing the log posterior ratio (LPR) and seeing that in our case we have LPR = LLR.
To see why, let us write Bayes' rule for the posterior probabilities p(R 1 | x) and p(R 2 | x):
Considering that R 1 and R 2 have equal prior probabilities [i.e., P(R 1 ) = P(R 2 )], this simplifies as
That is, the posterior ratio and the likelihood ratio are the same. Taking the log, we have
Additionally, given that R 1 and R 2 are the only two options [i.e., P(R 1 | x) + P(R 2 | x) = 1], we have LPRðxÞ ¼ ln pðR 1 j xÞ 1 − pðR 1 j xÞ :
Estimation of the LPR for each element. Thus, to simulate this model, we first estimated the LPR function of x (where x is a value in the decision space). To do so, we used a simple approach based on empirical probabilities (for a related approach, see supplementary material in ref. 1) to assess p(R 1 | x) and then used the equation above to convert this probability in a LPR. This procedure was done for each subject separately.
We derived the LPR function as follows. We considered all elements presented to the subject as associated with either R 1 or R 2 (according to the feedback). The goal is to determine a reasonable estimate of the posterior probability p(R 1 |x) for x varying along the parameter space. In each of 100 bins regularly spaced on the parameter space (after discarding 5% of extreme values for which the probability estimation involves very few data points) we computed p(R 1 |bin) as the frequency of R 1 being the correct association for the elements falling in that bin [p(R 1 | bin) = number of R 1 /number of elements falling in that bin]. We fitted the resulting probabilities with a sigmoid function over the bins, to capture the shape of the probability profile. We chose the sigmoid function because it provided a better account than other profiles, notably because our design involved a mixture of 12 Gaussian distributions with different means and variances (indeed, theoretically, the inverse cumulative normal distribution would be the true profile in the case of only 2 symmetrical Gaussian distribution with equal variance). We finally applied the fitted function to all individual elements. Fig. S3 presents the LPR functions for a sample of individual subjects.
Optimality of the LPR and conditional independence assumptions. The sum of the log-likelihood ratios is the optimal decision variable to consider for a bounded accumulation model (2, 3) . Because the likelihood ratios are equal to the posterior ratios (by Bayes' rule, when prior probabilities are equal, see above), the sum of the log of the posterior ratio is also the optimal decision variable. Additionally, because in our models the noise, bounds, and increments scale together (2), taking the summed or the averaged log ratio over the eight elements is equivalent. We favored the average to express all three models in similar forms.
Importantly, our estimation of the log posterior ratio described above is equal to the true log posterior ratio only under the conditions of conditional independence between the samples. To see this, let us write the true log posterior ratio of the full array:
When samples x 1 , . . . , x n are independent, then we have de Gardelle and Summerfield www.pnas.org/cgi/content/short/1104517108
Incorporating this expression into the previous line, we have
Rewriting the ln of the product as the sum of the ln, we see that the log posterior ratios for the individual elements appear in the expression
In this final line, we see that the decision variable used in the LPR model (i.e., the mean rather than the sum of the LPR over the elements) scales with the true log posterior ratio of the full array, if the samples are independent. Thus, the decision variable we implemented is optimal only under this independence condition. This condition independence is not satisfied, as individual elements are taken from only one distribution (out of 12 possible distributions) in any trial. Thus even though they might be conditionally independent given the particular distribution presented on the current trial, they are not conditionally independent given the reward category. Consequently, the LPR model we implemented is technically not the "true" optimal model, but it rather represents the optimal process for an observer considering (inaccurately) the elements as if they were independent.
Stability over time. We note that our method to compute the LPR function uses all trials presented to the subject, thus using information available to the subject only at the end of the experiment, whereas the resulting LPR is used in all trials, including the ones at the very beginning of the experiment. This property seems problematic. However, we provide several arguments for why we think this method is reasonable. First, subjects do receive instructions at the beginning of the experiment and build very rapidly an understanding of the categories in the task, so implementing a mapping learned "from a blank slate" (i.e., a flat prior distribution) would be also unrealistic. Second, assessing the evolution of the LPR function over time (Fig. S3) seems to indicate that the mapping is stable quite soon after the experiment starts. Fig. S3 shows for a random sample of subjects the posterior probability function of the position of x in the parameter space, estimated using the ∼1,000 trials of the whole experiment (red lines) or using only the first 300 trials of the experiment (blue lines). We also checked that the main results presented, and in particular the discarding of outliers, hold when only the first third of the experiment is considered. Given these points, we think that using a "stable" probability mapping computed over the whole experiment is a reasonable approximation for our simulations. S2 . Weighting profile across ranks for the simple averaging model (Left) and the SNR model (Right). In both cases, there was no effect of ranks on the beta coefficients [simple averaging model, F(7,532) = 1.15, P = 0.29; SNR model, F(7,532) = 1.30, P = 0.26], and in particular the beta coefficients were not different in inlying vs. outlying [simple averaging model, t(77) < 1, P = 0.62; SNR model, t(77) < 1, P = 0.51]. S5 . Estimation of the probability function P(R 1 | x) from the trials in the whole experiment (in red) or from only the first 300 trials (in blue), for several subjects in the study (each line is a subject).
de Gardelle and Summerfield www.pnas.org/cgi/content/short/1104517108 Fig. S6 . Weighting profile across ranks, for two individual subjects in the study.
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